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Introduction 
This paper offers critical reflections on the role, functions, problems and challenges of 
intermediary bodies in the United Kingdom (UK), and particularly those of Universities UK 
(UUK)1, the representative organisation for the heads of university institutions in England and 
Northern Ireland and all higher education institutions in Scotland and Wales.  Although I am 
not an expert on the Japanese higher education system, I will try to identify the similarities 
and differences between the UK and Japan and the circumstances of intermediary bodies in 
each country.  Both Japan and the UK are moving towards a similar goal – greater 
marketisation of higher education and increased, if nominal, autonomy of universities to 
operate in national, regional and global markets.  However, the two countries are starting from 
very different places and, in the UK at least, there is an increasing tendency for the State to 
regulate and steer higher education institutions to meet social, and particularly economic, 
goals.  In Japan, the incorporation of the national universities has apparently loosened the 
control of the Government over individual institutions, but the means of regulation – through 
funding, evaluation and accreditation – are still very strong compared with Britain.  These 
differences are important in understanding the role and potential influence of intermediary 
bodies in the two higher education systems.  So I will be cautious in suggesting any direct 
lessons to be learned from the UK experience. 
 
In particular, the UK and also Ireland (Eire, or southern Ireland, as distinct from Northern 
Ireland which is part of the UK) are unusual in having intermediary funding bodies between 
the government and the institutions2.  In the UK, in the past at least, these have acted as a 
‘buffer’3, preventing political interference in the allocation of funding to individual universities 
and offering advice to the government on policy and its implementation.  So, representative 
bodies, like UUK (and formerly, as the CVCP) have negotiated as much with the funding 
bodies about the details of policy implementation as with the government about the overall 
direction of policy.  Whether these funding bodies, and particularly for my purpose the Higher 
                                                     
1 http://www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/  The former Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals 
was renamed Universities UK in December 2000. 
2 OECD (2007) On the Edge: Securing a Sustainable Future for Higher Education, Paris: 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/20/24/38309943.pdf 
3 Bjarnason (1998) defines a ‘buffer organisation’ as “an organisation which is formally 
constituted and functions in an intermediary capacity between government and the 
university sector.” (p1), Bjarnson, Svava (1998) ”Buffer” Organisations in Higher Education: 
Illustrative Examples in the Commonwealth, London: Association of Commonwealth 
Universities. 
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Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE)4, still act as ‘buffer bodies’ is open to 
debate.  During the ‘New Labour’ Government under Prime Minister Tony Blair, universities 
increasingly became the focus of national economic policy.  Now, under the new Prime 
Minister, Gordon Brown (who was previously responsible for economic policy as Chancellor of 
the Exchequer for more than ten years) and a newly-formed ministry which combines higher 
education and science policy for the first time in 15 years5, the Labour Government is likely to 
become even more interventionist in higher education, in my view.  There is evidence to 
suggest that HEFCE is increasingly a government controlled agency with limited influence on 
the direction of policy and with less and less need to work in partnership with HEIs and their 
representative bodies. 
 
These developments have had significant implications for the representative bodies, like 
UUK, and for the external and internal governance of universities in England, and the UK as a 
whole.  They bring into question the capacity of intermediary bodies such as HEFCE and 
UUK to protect ‘academic freedom’ from incursion by politicians and other interested parties 
(such as employers of graduates and users of knowledge) and their perceived ‘gross 
utilitarianism’.  Despite the changes, however, these bodies may overestimate their influence 
and significantly constrain institutional autonomy through their influence on internal 
governance and management.  In an increasingly marketised, competitive and global higher 
education system, the roles and functions of intermediary bodies are being questioned and 
they face serious problems of credibility with both government and institutions.  In this paper, I 
will argue that the challenge they face is to reinvent themselves as key players at both 
national and institutional levels and thereby make a serious contribution to policy-making at a 
critical time in the realisation of mass higher education in the UK. 
 
 
Outline of the paper 
First, I outline the characteristics of higher education governance and regulation in the UK 
and make some tentative comparisons with Japan.  I then describe the internal governance of 
higher education institutions and the factors that have influenced its development.  My special 
focus is on Universities UK: its role, functions, structure and the problems it faces.  Fourth, I 
present the challenges for intermediary bodies in the UK and beyond.  Finally, I briefly pose 
some questions for university associations in Japan, drawn from my initial examination of 
developments and discussion at a conference for which the original version of this paper was 
prepared6. 
 
 
                                                     
4 According to HEFCE, it works in partnership and “promotes and funds high-quality, cost-
effective teaching and research, meeting the diverse needs of students, the economy and 
society”, http://www.hefce.ac.uk/ 
5 The Department of Innovation, Universities and Skills was established on 28 June 2007, 
http://www.dius.gov.uk/ 
6 Conference on The Functions of University Associations and Professional Bodies in Higher 
Education Governance, Tohoku University offices, Tokyo, 7 August 2007; sponsored by the 
Ministry of Education, MEXT 
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1. Characteristics of Higher Education governance in the UK 
 
National HE systems: key characteristics and governance 
It is important to understand the essential characteristics of higher education systems and 
their governance before investigating the role and place of intermediary bodies. 
Key features of selected HE systems
From OECD, 2007 (based on 2004 data)
 
This table shows some key features of selected higher education systems from the report of 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) project on the 
financial management and governance of HE institutions7.  Comparing England and Japan, it 
is notable that, while both have national rather than federal or state systems, there is no 
private university sector to speak of in England.  Since 1992, when polytechnics were given 
university status, the binary division – at least in name – was dissolved.  So England, and 
indeed the UK as a whole, has a unitary system in which all universities are ostensibly treated 
the same.  Japan has a little under twice the number of students but nearly ten times as many 
institutions as England.  The UK system expanded significantly between the late 1980s and 
the mid-1990s and continues to grow, albeit at a slower pace, but the number of institutions 
remained largely the same.  Instead, the institutions themselves grew in size.  Finally, the 
average proportion of institutional income from the state is 55% in Japan and slightly more at 
60% in England, although this varies significantly between institutions in England and, I 
suspect, in Japan, too. 
                                                     
7 OECD (2007) Op. Cit. 
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Some characteristics of national systems of governance
From OECD, 2007
 
From the same report, this table focuses on characteristics of governance in national 
systems.  The UK system is closest to the third row – a State and private partnership.  
Institutions are independent but they are subject to State controls: the State determines 
whether an institution can call itself a ‘university’, for example, and whether it can award 
research degrees.  It also exerts influence on institutions through funding mechanisms.  
However, institutions have complete autonomy over who they hire (within national 
employment legislation), so in this third column they are closer to private institutions.  They 
own their own assets but the State does provide some capital funding to supplement 
institutions’ own resources.  They also generate and retain income from other sources, both 
public and private: from research and consultancy contracts, for example, and increasingly 
tuition fees from students.  Although the incorporation of national universities has shifted 
Japan away from a State owned system, I suspect that it includes examples from all the other 
types of institution in this table.  This makes it a more differentiated system than in the UK and 
so, I surmise, the internal governance arrangements of institutions may equally vary. 
 4
Public and private expenditure on higher education as a 
percentage of GDP (2000)
OECD, 2004
 
So, how are these differences in relationships between the state and institutions reflected in 
the expenditure on higher education in each country as a proportion of its Gross Domestic 
Product (or GDP for short)?8  Note that, although the total expenditure on higher education in 
Japan and the UK are similar in proportion to GDP, the ratio of public to private expenditure is 
higher in the UK.  No doubt, with the increase in tuition fees in England from 2006, this ratio 
will reduce. 
 
                                                     
8 OECD (2004) Financial Management and Governance in HEIs: England, Paris: Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/5/33643920.PDF 
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This graph shows the trend in public spending on higher education in England since 
1989/909.  Overlaid on the graph is the purple line showing the growth in the number of 
students: this is to give an idea of the pace of expansion – there is no axis of measurement, 
but it shows the overall trajectory upwards.  So, although in real terms the amount of public 
expenditure on higher education grew, it did not keep up with expansion and therefore the 
expenditure per student (or unit of funding) dropped from £9,000 per student in 1989/90 to 
under £5,500 so far this decade as shown by the black line.  From 1998/99 this was 
supplemented by tuition fees for full-time undergraduate courses for home and European 
Union students (shown by the red line) and by capital funding (in blue).  From this academic
year, 2006/07, and as a result of the 2004 Higher Education Act, income from the private 
regulated fee (in red) is also being supplemented by increased tui
 
tion fees of up to £3,000 per 
ear. 
ms of 
fect, to 
ity 
er 
education as an economic resource and higher education institutions that should be 
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So, as the system has expanded and a larger proportion of young people are participating, 
higher education has become a much greater concern of governments, not least in ter
public expenditure.  However, the reduction in the funding per unit has put increasing 
pressure on institutions to reduce costs and increase income from other sources – in ef
operate more like businesses.  Under the ‘New Labour’ Government of Tony Blair, the 
expansion of higher education became a policy goal and a means for improving productiv
and competitiveness and thereby economic growth.  The dominant ideology is of high
9 From Eastwood, D (2007) ‘Developments, future trends and opportunities’, Notes from a 
speech by Professor David Eastwood, Chief Executive, HEFCE to the HEFCE Annual 
Conference, 18-19 April 2007 
http://www.hefce.ac.uk/news/events/annconf/text/DavidEastwood.doc. 
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responsive to economic needs10.  So, what is taught has to be relevant to employers’ 
requirements, applied research is more important than pure knowledge, and the State must 
hold institutions accountable for carrying out their economic role effectively.  Hence, 
governments, from that of Margaret Thatcher (Prime Minister from 1979 to 1990) onwards, 
have felt justified in regulating higher education in order to pursue national policy goals.  
Higher education is no longer just the concern of the education ministry (until recently called 
the Department for Education and Skills in England), it is also of concern to ministries 
responsible for trade and industry, health, and immigration among others.  Indeed, in his 
recent reorganisation of government departments, the new Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, 
has separated higher education from schools and coupled it with ‘innovation’ and improving 
the skills of the workforce (in the Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills). 
 
Intermediary bodies in the UK: a complex web of relationships 
So, where do intermediary organisations such as university associations and professional 
bodies fit in the relationships between the State and higher education institutions in the UK?   
HEFCE,
2005 
(amended)
Relationships between the State & HEIs in the UK
£
£ £
£
 
This is a simplified diagram of the relations between Government, the Funding bodies and the 
Universities and colleges of higher education.  It shows the funding bodies as intermediaries 
between the State and the higher education institutions.  These include the funding councils 
for England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, the Research Councils and other funding 
bodies, such as the Training and Development Agency for schools.  The Representative 
bodies on the right of the diagram include Universities UK and Guild HE, which represents the 
colleges of higher education or higher education institutions without university status in 
England.  But, increasingly, we should take account of the interest groups of universities: the 
Russell Group representing research-intensive universities like Oxford and Cambridge; the 
                                                     
10 Salter, Brian and Tapper, Ted (2002) ‘The external pressures on the internal governance of 
Universities’, Higher Education Quarterly, 56(3), 245-256. 
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1994 Group of other smaller, research-orientated pre-1992 universities; the CMU (or 
Campaigning for Mainstream Universities) representing post-1992 universities that were 
previously polytechnics; and other groups, such as professional associations.  I will come 
back to these interest groups later.  The Agencies consist of sector-wide organisations 
established to perform a particular role, like the Quality Assurance Agency, Universities and 
Colleges Admissions Service and the Higher Education Statistics Agency. 
 
Generally speaking, funding is allocated by the Funding bodies on behalf of the Government 
to the Universities and colleges.  But a small amount of money is paid to some of the 
Agencies for services provided.  Likewise, Universities and colleges may buy services from, 
or pay a subscription to, some of the sector Agencies.  The institutions also pay subscriptions 
to the Representative bodies.  And finally, the Funding bodies occasionally commission the 
Representative bodies to carry out research on their behalf or perform some other task.  So 
the relationships between these parties are quite complex in reality. 
 
These relationships are even more complex because the four territories of the UK – England, 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland – have different arrangements. 
UUK, 2006a
 
 
England has by far the largest higher education sector, with 72 universities and 79% of all 
higher education institutions (or 133 out of 168).  So, when I come to analyse in detail I will 
focus mainly on England. 
 
 8
Sources of funds for HEIs in the UK, 2002-03
HEFCE,
2005
 
 
This diagram predates the recent reorganisation of Government departments, but shows the 
various streams of funding for higher education institutions.  Those in the blue boxes along 
the top of the diagram are Government or public funds and those in the white boxes along the 
bottom are predominantly non-government or private funds, including tuition fees from 
students. 
 
Funding mechanisms remain the key policy instrument by which the Government, through the 
Funding Councils and Government Departments, influence higher education institutions.  With 
the rapid expansion of higher education and the reduced unit of funding, universities and 
colleges are under pressure to chase the same few additional pots of money that become 
available, regardless of their mission or strategic plan11.  There is a strong traditional English 
idea of the university in which all institutions more or less conform to the same model, which 
is heavily influenced by the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge12.  And there is a pervasive 
ideology of meritocracy and concern for fair play, a level playing field and equal treatment.  
This has led to less diversity among university missions, especially since the end of the binary 
divide in 199213.  The most recent example of this is that almost all higher education 
institutions set tuition fees for full-time undergraduates at the maximum of £3,000, despite the 
Government introducing variable fees.  This echoes the tendency towards imitation rather 
                                                     
11 King, Roger (2004) The University in the Global Age, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave 
MacMillan. 
12 Tapper, Ted and Salter, Brian (2003) ‘Understanding governance and policy change in 
British Higher Education’, Occasional Paper No. 11, Oxford: Oxford Centre for Higher 
Education Policy Studies, 
http://oxcheps.new.ox.ac.uk/MainSite%20pages/Resources/OxCHEPS_Op11.pdf. 
13 Salter, Brian and Tapper, Ted (2002) ‘The external pressures on the internal governance of 
Universities’, Higher Education Quarterly, 56(3), 245-256. 
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than innovation that Professor Gary Rhoades described in his presentation on academic 
capitalism for this project earlier this year14. 
 
The Higher Education Funding Council for England 
As I suggested above, there are different relationships between the Higher Education Funding 
Council and the governmental authority in each of the four territories in the UK.  These have 
become even more diverse since the New Labour Government’s policy of devolution from 
1997.  I will now focus on England, where there is a principal-agent relationship between 
Government and the Higher Education Funding Council for England (or HEFCE), in which the 
principal (the Government) ensures the agent (HEFCE) allocates public funds in accordance 
with the principal’s priorities15.  Each year, the Secretary of State for Education issues a ‘letter 
of guidance’ to the Chair of the Funding Council, setting out the priorities for the coming year.  
HEFCE manages the financial allocation, but it is not a planning body – the institutional 
autonomy of universities is enshrined in law, rather like that of the BBC16, but unlike most 
other public services in the UK. 
 
HEFCE’s role is that of co-ordination – or implementation – rather than reform17, but it is 
responsible for the standard of the higher education that it funds, and it does this in 
consultation with the higher education sector.  Its concern is damage limitation rather than 
policy initiation, and it seeks to ensure that higher education institutions do not fail.  So it also 
has responsibility for overseeing institutions’ financial auditing.  However, from time to time, 
HEFCE does offer robust advice to the Government and has sought to protect the sector from 
the worst excesses of the State18.  Certainly this ensures stability but it may also inhibit 
change. 
 
However, its funding allocation mechanisms can be used to influence universities’ and 
colleges’ pursuit of private income, from endowments, business and recently employers who 
are expected to fund courses that directly meet their training needs.  So, by means of the 
influence that funding bestows, HEFCE has become more of a regulator, albeit reluctantly, in 
order to protect the public interest.  This is no surprise, as intermediate regulatory bodies are 
increasingly seen as more effective operators than direct Government control19.  Even when 
vice-chancellors (like presidents in Japanese universities) criticise particular funding 
mechanisms (for example, ring-fenced funding streams for particular Government initiatives), 
some faculty and administrators within universities may welcome the support they offer (for 
example, to widen access to poor students or introduce innovations in teaching and learning). 
                                                     
14  Rhoades, Gary (2007) ‘Is Academic Capitalism, US Style, for Japan?  Challenges, Costs, 
Choices’, presentation to a conference on A Comparative Study on the Functions of 
University Associations and Professional Bodies in Higher Education Governance 
sponsored by MEXT, April. 
15 Yokoyama, Keiko (2006a) ‘Modes of Higher Education Co-ordination: the Cases of England 
and Japan’, Higher Education Research in Japan, Volume 3, 85-100. 
16 Kogan, Maurice and Hanney, Stephen (2000) Reforming Higher Education, London: 
Jessica Kingsley. 
17 Yokoyama (2006a) Op. Cit. 
18 Scott, Peter (2007) A personal view of the funding council: Perspectives on success…and 
failure, Occasional Paper 31, Oxford Centre for Higher Education Policy Studies, University 
of Oxford 
http://oxcheps.new.ox.ac.uk/MainSite%20pages/Resources/OxCHEPS_OP31.pdf 
19 King (2004) Op. Cit. 
 10
 
But there are other means for Government to steer the higher education system in the UK 
than just funding mechanisms, such as forms of evaluation, accountability and marketisation. 
 
Evaluation, accountability and marketisation 
The longest running form of evaluation in the UK is the Research Assessment Exercise 
(RAE), which is a review of research outputs by university departments.  Introduced in 1986, 
this predominantly peer review process has taken place at intervals of between 3 and 7 years 
and is used to allocate money from the Funding Councils to institutions, who can then 
disburse this as they wish.  The RAE was quickly adopted by the Government as a key 
element of national policy – not just an evaluation method linked to a mechanism for 
allocating funding, but more recently as a means of restructuring the sector in order to 
promote a small number of so-called ‘elite’ universities and increase UK competitiveness in 
research world-wide20.  In 2006, the Chancellor of the Exchequer (equivalent to the Minister 
of Finance in Japan) announced the abolition of the existing format of the RAE and th
replacement of peer review with quantitative measurements (of bibliographic citations, 
research income generated and numbers of research students graduating, for example) 
which are likely to further advantage the larger providers of scientific research. 
e 
                                                     
 
Since the early 1990s, the quality assurance of teaching has focused on the accountability of 
institutions and the basic academic units.  In the assessment of teaching there has been an 
increasing concern with outcomes and outputs that can be quantified and standards that can 
be compared, rather than inputs and processes that have to be interpreted and 
contextualised.  This has led to a preoccupation with procedures, documentation and 
presentation rather than with teaching and learning as such.  It has also privileged certain 
definitions of what counts as evidence of quality, which is largely quantifiable – in other words, 
performance indicators.  Intended or not, quality assessment of teaching in the UK has given 
rise to superficial compliance with the criteria for the higher quality grades and the ritualistic 
performance of procedures associated with the assessment. 
 
Both the assessment of teaching and research require the involvement of the academic 
community and can therefore be viewed as forms of self-regulation.  However, it is interesting 
to note that academics from the pre-1992 research-orientated universities have tended to be 
more involved in research assessment, and those from post-1992 vocational universities were 
quicker to engage with teaching assessment.  Moreover, the activities of teaching and 
research have become almost completely separated.  As I have argued elsewhere, this 
separation is itself the result of policy and operational decisions made over two decades to 
distinguish the way these activities are funded, managed, assessed and rewarded21. 
 
20 Scott, P (2006) ‘Divergence or Convergence? The Links between Teaching and Research 
in Mass Higher Education’ in Barnett, R (ed) Reshaping the University, Maidenhead: 
McGraw-Hill/Open University Press/Society for Research in Higher Education, pp 53-66. 
21 Locke, W (2004) ‘Integrating Research and Teaching Strategies: Implications for 
Institutional Management and Leadership in the United Kingdom’, Higher Education 
Management and Policy, OECD, 16(1), 101-120. 
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A number of consumerist ‘levers’ have also been introduced recently that are designed to 
help students to compare institutions and courses and so exert pressure on HEIs to 
improve22.  Teaching Quality Assessment and Subject Review gradings, performance 
indicators, the National Student Survey and Teaching Quality Information are just a few 
examples of the mechanisms established by the Government and the UK Funding Councils 
during the last ten years or so in order ‘to encourage providers to deliver a better quality 
service’, ‘to achieve benchmark levels of performance’ and so on.  The media have picked up 
on this and started ‘naming and shaming’ institutions that fail to reach the benchmarks set for 
them and producing league tables in the name of increasing consumer choice. 
 
These initiatives are designed to introduce market mechanisms alongside capped tuition fees 
and competition for research funding, but have a tendency to encourage institutions to 
become preoccupied with reputation and branding rather than real improvement – in other 
words, they may grow to be more concerned with appearance than with substance.  However, 
the mechanisms only constitute a quasi-market which is still carefully regulated and managed 
by the State and its intermediary bodies.  Comparative analysis suggests that the UK has the 
strongest characteristics of a quasi-market in higher education among the major western 
European countries23. 
 
According to Keiko Yokoyama, Government regulation, control and remote steering co-exist 
in complex ways in both the UK and Japan24.  In the UK, there has been oscillation in state-
university relationships, with hyper-policy experimentation leading to unintended 
consequences and, in some cases, the subsequent retraction of policies25.  Since before 
Margaret Thatcher there has been a decline in governments’ trust in the professions, and 
academia has been no exception.  However, there has also been an enduring recognition that 
creativity, dynamism and scientific development depend on high levels of institutional 
autonomy and academic freedom.  According to Roger King, the State is caught on the horns 
of a dilemma between encouraging innovation and avoiding risk through regulation and this 
has resulted in a patchwork design of policy instruments26.  Governments are also aware that 
institutions and academics are creative in learning to play regulatory games and can meet 
performance targets while at the same time undermining the intentions of their policy goals27. 
 
Fundamentally, though, as Mary Henkel pointed out on a recent visit to Hiroshima, the 
framework of governance for higher education is based on the value and belief system 
underpinning it: the conception of the university, its purposes and its relationship with the 
                                                     
22 Naidoo, R (2006) ‘Universities in the Marketplace: The distortion of teaching and research’, 
in Reshaping the University: New relationships between research, scholarship and 
teaching, London: Open University Press/Society for Research in Higher Education, pp 27-
36. 
23 Agasisti, Tommaso and Giuseppe Catalano (2006) ‘Governance models of university 
systems – towards quasi-markets@ Tendencies and perspectives: A European 
comparison’, Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management, 28(3): 245-262. 
24 Yokoyama (2006a) Op. Cit. 
25 King, Roger (2006) Analysing the Higher Education Regulatory State, Discussion Paper 
No. 38, Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation, London School of Economics, 
November. 
26 King, Roger (2007) ‘Governance and accountability in the higher education regulatory 
state’, Higher Education, 53: 411-430. 
27 Tapper and Salter (2003) Op. Cit. 
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State and society28.  Increasingly, in the UK this conception is about the role of higher 
education in improving the nation’s economic productivity and competitiveness.  So, in both 
our countries, it may be that common political philosophies are leading to the use of similar 
policy instruments despite the rather different histories of the higher education systems in the 
UK and Japan. 
 
 
2. The internal governance of HE institutions 
 
Vertical stratification and institutional governance 
The UK higher education system is vertically stratified, ie hierarchical.  Before 1992, 
universities were established as charitable bodies with charters which enshrined their 
institutional autonomy.  The academics originally had much more influence on the 
governance of the institution than they do today.  The polytechnics, however, were under 
local government control until their incorporation in 1988 and were always characterised by 
more centralised management and corporate-style governance.  With the end of the binary 
line in 1992, when polytechnics became universities, their recently gained autonomy was 
further strengthened.  However, this same legislation effectively reduced the old universities’ 
autonomy by requiring the newly established Funding Councils to evaluate the quality of 
university output – something the former polytechnics were already very used to, but the old 
universities never had.  More recently, some of the smaller higher education colleges have 
been awarded the title of ‘university’ since the criteria were changed in 2004 and research 
degree-awarding powers are no longer required for the ‘university’ title. 
 
So, there are significant differences in the origin, size, resources, academic (and, particularly, 
research) strength and reputation of higher education institutions in the UK.  These 
differences are also reflected in the varying forms of internal governance found in universities 
and colleges.  The Government and the Funding Councils apply the same rules to all higher 
education institutions, regardless of their circumstances, but the institutions differ greatly in 
their dependence on public funding, their access to private finance and their relations with 
business, for example.  So, in practice, their institutional autonomy is contingent on these 
other factors, which places different institutions in very different relationships of power and 
influence with the Government and its intermediary bodies. 
 
Let me illustrate these institutional differences with the following table and charts. 
 
                                                     
28 Henkel, Mary (2007) ‘Changes in the governance and management of the university: the 
role of governments and third-party agencies’, in Changing Governance in Higher 
Education: Incorporation, marketisation, and other reforms – A comparative study, COE 
Publication Series No. 29: pps 3-14, March, Research Institute for Higher Education, 
Hiroshima University. 
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UUK,
2006a
 
On the left of this table is the range of income of individual institutions in the academic year 
2004/05 in millions of pounds, ranging from less than £10m to more than £150m.  It is clear 
that there is a fairly even spread throughout the range.  On the right hand side are the 
numbers of students in each institution, from less than 1,000 to more than 20,000.  Again, the 
figures show there are nearly as many small institutions as there are middle-size and large 
institutions. 
Funding council income as a percentage of all income, 
2004/05, UK
UUK,
2006b
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This chart shows the proportion of their income that institutions receive from the Funding 
Councils.  Each bar represents a different institution, and the proportion ranges from less than 
10% of an institution’s income to as much as 80%.  So, dependence on Funding Council 
income also varies a great deal. 
Public funding of research (£K), 2004/05, UK
UUK,
2006b
 
The situation is much more skewed, however, when we focus on the public funding of 
research, which is heavily concentrated in a few research-intensive universities (for example 
Oxford, Cambridge, Imperial College and University College, London). 
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Income from international (non-EU) student fees (£K), 
2004/05, UK
UUK,
2006b
 
The chart showing income from international students is less skewed, but it still shows a huge 
variation between a few institutions earning over £20 million in 2004/05 and those earning 
hardly anything. 
Variations in sources of income for UK HE 
institutions, 2003/04
HESA, 2005
 
Putting the main sources together in one chart, we can see the variation in the proportions 
from different sources for different institutions.  Again, each bar represents a different 
institution, but in this chart the bars now show the proportions of different sources of funding 
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of the total income for each institution.  So, income from ‘Tuition fees, education grants and 
contracts’  is shown at the top of each institutional bar, then ‘Funding Council grants’, ‘Other’ 
income and finally ‘Research grants and contracts at the bottom – this chart shows the stark 
variation of income profiles across the higher education sector in the UK. 
 
My point is that this vertical stratification – or hierarchy – makes it difficult for universities to 
agree common positions, because their interests diverge so much.  The Government wants to 
increase horizontal differentiation between institutions – in other words functional diversity – 
which would enable universities with different missions to position themselves in the market in 
order to compete more effectively in their particular niche.  However, the universities 
themselves are increasingly concerned about reputation – and avoiding criticism by 
evaluators and ‘naming and shaming’ by the media – and are seeking ‘branding’ by belonging 
to interest groups.  The danger is that this approach is likely to lead to greater Government 
intervention, not less. 
 
The role of the vice-chancellor in the governance of universities 
The role of the vice-chancellor is critical in the governance of UK universities, as is the 
president now in the National University Corporations and the private universities in Japan.  In 
1988 in the UK, with the creation of a national Funding Council, the vice-chancellor was 
designated the chief accounting officer and, in effect, was the chief executive of the 
organisation.  In the 1990s, this post increasingly became a fixed term appointment, for five 
years say, rather than a semi-permanent position.  Appointments were more often made from 
outside the university rather than by promotion from within.  So a new vice-chancellor would 
want to make his or her mark very quickly.  In the early part of this decade, there was a spate 
of appointments of vice-chancellors from other countries, particularly from the United States, 
Australia and South Africa.  So, in many ways, the position has become more and more like 
the chief executive of a large corporate company. 
 
This development was reinforced by a ‘managerial revolution’ in higher education and in other 
public services.  Faced with financial constraints and increasing evaluation by Government, 
institutions strengthened their senior and middle management in order to act more decisively, 
protect their institution’s interests and become more strategic.  However, they often did so at 
the expense of academics’ influence on the direction of the institution.  Sometimes the senior 
management might even use external pressures as a pretext to implement changes within 
their institutions, even when alternative responses – such as resistance – were available.  
The overall effect was the strengthening of power and authority of the institution – what Mary 
Henkel has called “a radical redefinition of institutional autonomy”29 – and a reduction in 
academic freedom and the influence of senates and academic boards. 
 
Hence, professors in the UK have always been less powerful and influential than their 
counterparts in continental Europe and other countries where institutional power was 
constrained by more direct governmental control.  In the UK, governments have been 
increasingly suspicious of the academic profession and much more likely to accept vice-
                                                     
29 Henkel (2007) Op. Cit. p7. 
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chancellors’ interpretation of the academic community’s views30.  Some senior academics 
have joined a growing cadre of ‘academic managers’.  Whereas there has been a tradition – 
especially in the older universities – of management tasks being assumed by senior 
academics on an elected, rotating, short-term and frequently part-time basis, this pattern is 
increasingly being replaced by appointment to full-time, ‘permanent’ management roles.  
These ‘academic managers’ quite quickly become separated from their previous colleagues, 
but few have received management training.  So they rarely become entirely comfortable 
working alongside their colleagues who are non-academic managers.  Sector-wide, there are 
professional associations for administrators and non-academic managers, such as the 
Association of University Administrators and specialist associations for finance, estates, 
personnel and so on.  However, there are no equivalents for academic managers. 
 
Initiatives on leadership, governance and management of universities 
Despite the ‘managerial revolution’ in higher education, the Treasury – the equivalent of the 
Ministry of Finance in Japan – has frequently been critical of the management of universities 
and colleges.  It has sought the introduction of corporate models of governance and an 
increase in the influence from outside in the steering of higher education institutions.  There 
have been a number of initiatives, largely from outside the sector, to ‘modernise’ institutional 
leadership, governance and management in line with reforms that have taken place in the 
business world.  The following are just some of the most recent and prominent developments: 
 
• A series of guidelines on good practice issued by the Committee of University Chairmen 
(the external chairs of the university governing bodies in the UK) (from the mid-1990s 
onwards: latest edition, 2004). 
 
• The Lambert Code of good practice for governing bodies published in a Government-
commissioned report on business-university collaboration (2003). 
 
• Increasing pressure on the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge to radically reform their 
governance arrangements (from the late 1990s onwards). 
 
• The establishment of the Leadership Foundation for Higher Education (LFHE) which 
provides advice, support and training in the development of governance and management 
for universities and colleges in the UK (since 2004). 
 
However, apart from the LFHE, these initiatives are predominantly concerned with the 
governing bodies of universities and colleges, rather than governance throughout the 
institution, for example, at programme, department and school or faculty levels.  Certainly, 
these initiatives have reinforced the trends towards managerialism.  However, Michael 
Shattock has questioned how far these policy and structural changes have actually led to 
changes in the organisational and professional cultures of higher education institutions and, 
indeed, to improvements in institutional performance31.  It is pertinent to ask whether the 
                                                     
30 Henkel (2007) Op. Cit. p9. 
31 Shattock, Michael (2006) ‘University Governance and the Role of the State’, in McNay, I 
(ed) Beyond Mass Higher Education, London: Open University Press/Society for Research 
in Higher Education, pp209-216. 
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changes in the academic profession and the administrative workforce merely reflect these 
policies or whether they are also, partly, a reaction to them?  Gary Rhoades32 has suggested 
that “the academy internally develops and internalises market based governance structures”, 
but I am not convinced this is uniformly the case. 
 
So, to summarise this paper so far: increasingly, UK higher education is characterised by a 
market-orientation in which the self-interested actions of the individual institutions reinforce 
and modify the existing vertical stratification.  This makes it more and more difficult for the 
parties to work collectively in the best interests of a ‘higher education sector’, let alone in the 
public interest. 
 
 
3. Universities UK: its role, functions, structure and the problems and 
challenges it faces 
 
This section focuses on Universities UK, its role, functions, structure and the problems and 
challenges it faces. 
 
The role and functions of Universities UK 
The present organisation was originally formed as the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and 
Principals of the Universities of the United Kingdom (CVCP) in 1918 just before the 
Government’s original ‘buffer body’, the University Grants Committee (UGC), was established 
in 1919.  It changed its name in 2000 to Universities UK to reflect the work of the organisation 
and so that the name had a direct link to higher education and a more modern sound to it.  
Nevertheless, the members are the individual vice-chancellors and principals of the 
universities in the United Kingdom, as well as the colleges of higher education in Scotland 
and Wales (but not in England and Wales, which are represented by Guild HE). 
 
Universities UK’s vision: “…is of UK universities that are autonomous, properly funded from a 
diversity of sources, accessible to all, delivering high quality teaching and learning, and at the 
leading edge of research of regional, national and international significance.”33  Its mission: 
“…is to be the essential voice of UK universities by promoting and supporting their work.”  It 
achieves this by: 
• Influencing stakeholders (such as the Government; students, their families and the 
general public; the professions; employers, business and industry and so on); 
• Providing informed policy analysis (on which to base its political lobbying, media relations 
and submissions to various reviews); 
• Co-ordinating sector agencies (such as the Universities and Colleges Admissions 
Service, the Universities and Colleges Employers’ Association which negotiates on pay 
and conditions of employment, and the Higher Education Statistics Agency.  UUK also 
recently helped set up the Leadership Foundation and the Higher Education Academy); 
                                                     
32 Rhoades (2007) Op. Cit. p6. 
33 http://www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/mission/ 
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• Providing member exclusive services (such as information on technical issues, research 
findings, guidance on good practice, negotiating agreements on behalf of the sector, for 
example, on copyright); and 
• Enhancing its own operational efficiency and effectiveness (by reducing costs and 
ensuring income streams in addition to institutional subscriptions). 
 
The key constituent elements of Universities UK 
The membership of Universities UK is currently 128 heads of higher education institutions.  
The new President from August 2007 is Professor Rick Trainor, Principal of King’s College, 
University of London, a member of the Russell Group, as was his predecessor.  The 
President is elected by the membership and serves for two years, and he or she continues in 
their role as head of their institution at the same time.  The President chairs the Members’ 
Meetings and the other key committees.  Since 1995, the Chief Executive has been Baroness 
Diana Warwick, who was made a life peer in the House of Lords in 1999. 
 
Universities UK has three autonomous National Councils covering England and Northern 
Ireland, Scotland and Wales.  Universities Scotland represents the Heads of higher education 
institutions in Scotland, and Higher Education Wales represents Heads of institutions in 
Wales.  The England and Northern Ireland Council represents the remaining members on 
issues that do not have UK-wide implications.  The chairs of the three National Councils are 
the Vice-Presidents of UUK. 
 
The membership of UUK elects a UK Board of 24 members including the President, the three 
Vice-Presidents and the Treasurer.  The President nominates up to 6 members to serve on 
this board.  The UK Board is Universities UK’s main decision-making body and it meets five 
times a year.  
 
The Executive is a sub-committee of the UK Board and comprises the President, the three 
Vice-Presidents and the Treasurer.  The Executive meets five times a year and acts on behalf 
of the UK Board as necessary to support and advise the Chief Executive, and authorises 
action as required when issues arise demanding a response from UUK before the next 
meeting of the Board.  The Executive also undertakes certain routine monitoring, co-
ordinating, planning and liaison functions on behalf of the Board and reports the outcomes to 
the full Board.  
 
More detailed policy work is undertaken by a series of Policy Committees listed here.   
Employability, Business and Industry Policy Committee 
Funding and Management Policy Committee 
Health and Social Care Policy Committee 
International and European Policy Committee 
Research Policy Committee 
Student Experience Policy Committee 
Teacher Education Advisory Group 
 
The Longer Term Strategy Group provides a forum to involve Universities UK members in 
developing longer-term policy by identifying and debating new issues of potential significance. 
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This Group aims to strengthen UUK's capacity to set the national agenda for higher 
education. 
 
This organisational structure is supported by a staff of approximately 55, comprising of the 
four groups shown here.   
• The External Relations and Communications Group manages campaigning and lobbying; 
• The Policy Development Group advises on a range of policy and technical issues and 
supports the Policy Committees and the Longer Term Strategy Group; 
• The Research Unit undertakes and commissions research and analysis to support policy 
development and campaigning; and 
• The Resources Group manages finance, personnel and membership issues as well as 
servicing the key committees. 
 
Where has CVCP/Universities UK had most impact in recent years? 
It is revealing to ask where CVCP, now Universities UK, has had most impact in the last 25 
years.  Of course, it is difficult to separate the effect of the organisation as a whole from that 
of particular influential universities, like Oxford and Cambridge, and powerful alliances of 
institutions such as the Russell Group.  The following is a personal assessment of its major 
influences – although these should not be seen as absolute successes, as some of the long 
term effects have been mixed. 
 
Starting from the early part of this period during Margaret Thatcher’s premiership, the 
management of universities was significantly influenced by what was known in 1985 as the 
Jarrett Report on university efficiency and management, prompted by the University Grants 
Committee (or UGC), which gave voice to the pressure for universities to adopt commercial or 
industrial models of strategic planning in order to achieve efficiencies and seek alternative 
sources of funds to dwindling UGC grants.  This was really the start of the ‘managerial 
revolution’ referred to earlier. 
 
Shortly afterwards in 1989, the CVCP resisted an attempt by the short-lived successor to the 
UGC, the Universities Funding Council, to expand higher education ‘on the cheap’ by 
encouraging universities to bid for additional student numbers at lower than the marginal unit 
cost34. 
 
In 1992, when the polytechnics (created in 1965) became universities, the CVCP was prompt 
in merging with its equivalent (in what had been called the Public Sector of Higher Education 
[or PSHE]) – the Committee of Directors of Polytechnics.  This formed a representative body 
for all universities that suddenly increased in size from 47 to 100 and offered a united front to 
the newly formed Higher Education Funding Councils for England, Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland. 
 
                                                     
34 Tapper, Ted and Salter, Brian (1997) ‘Who will speak for the universities? The Committee 
of Vice-Chancellors and Principals in the age of mass higher education’, Higher Education 
Quarterly, 51(2), 113-133 
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In the mid-1990s, the CVCP provided significant impetus to the National Committee of Inquiry 
on Higher Education (commonly known as the Dearing Report, after its chair, then Sir Ron 
(now Lord) Dearing), which helped to achieve recognition of the need for cost-sharing in 
higher education, with students paying towards the costs of their tuition. 
 
The change of name in 2000 to ‘Universities UK’ helped to raise the profile of the organisation 
and its capacity to speak on behalf of universities and enhance its role in the policy-making 
process.  However, this was also assisted by the New Labour Government increasingly 
focusing on universities and the media’s obsession with issues such as unequal access to the 
most prestigious universities, and rising student debt. 
 
In a series of reports and submissions to the Government’s Comprehensive Spending 
Reviews in the early 2000s, UUK established the gap between existing institutional income 
and what was needed to fund expansion towards the Government’s target of 50% of 18-30 
years olds in higher education by 2010. 
 
This certainly helped to build the case for what became known as ‘top-up’ or ‘variable’ fees – 
or allowing higher education institutions to charge up to £3,000 per year to UK (and other 
European Union) students for full-time undergraduate courses.  By negotiating with the 
various university interest groups and supporting the Government’s policy, UUK managed to 
neutralise the opposition within higher education to ‘top-up’ fees, at least for the passage of 
the Higher Education Bill through Parliament in 2004. 
 
It is clear from these few examples that, even when CVCP/UUK has had a significant impact, 
it is either in support of the existing direction of governments’ thinking or a more broadly 
developing consensus, or it is simply moderating the most damaging effects of government-
initiated policies. 
 
In recent years, much of what has been achieved by the sector has not been by the 
organisation as such, but by its most influential members.  For example, a ‘lighter touch’ 
teaching quality assurance regime for institutions, the case for reform of the Research 
Assessment Exercise, and the retention of the ‘dual support’ system for funding research.  
HEFCE has probably had more influence on reining in the more interventionist tendencies of 
the New Labour Government.  For example, by setting limits on the concentration of research 
funding in a handful of universities, and forestalling Government intervention on the provision 
of teaching of ‘strategic and vulnerable’ subjects that were susceptible to cuts or departmental 
closure by institutions. 
 
Indeed, I would argue that some of UUK’s policies and pronouncements have actually 
damaged its reputation among academics and administrators in universities.  Many see UUK 
as the vice-chancellors’ club working in the interests of the leaders and senior management in 
institutions, and not necessarily on behalf of the sector as a whole.  But the teaching unions, 
subject associations and professional associations, such as the Association of University 
Administrators, have little influence of their own at a national policy level. 
 
The main problems facing Universities UK 
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So, this discussion indicates where Universities UK’s key problems lie. 
 
The Government wants to be able to negotiate with UUK as long as the organisation can 
‘deliver’ the majority of its members35, including the most influential universities.  The more a 
body like UUK can help the Government achieve its policy goals, the more influence it can 
potentially have with ministers36.  However, UUK has no real influence over its members: it 
has no sanctions if they do not fall into line, and little in the way of incentives to encourage 
them if they do not want to ‘play ball’. 
 
Indeed, many of the recent developments in policy have increased the divisions among 
member institutions.  During the last decade, devolution has widened the variation between 
the national higher education systems, particularly between Scotland (which has always had 
distinctive arrangements) and the rest of the UK.  The 2004 Higher Education Act changed 
the criteria for university title in England, so that institutions applying for this status no longer 
require research degree awarding powers.  Eleven higher education colleges have become 
universities in the last two years – albeit teaching-orientated and locally-based.  They are 
eligible for membership of UUK, and most have joined.  The increased marketisation of higher 
education has set universities in greater competition with each other for students (both UK 
and international), research funding and business contracts. 
 
The increased prominence of the interest groups of universities has both contributed to this 
differentiation within the sector and been caused by it.  These groups are becoming mini-
versions of UUK, each with a full-time secretariat, their own lobbying capacity, a website and 
distinctive branding.  The three main groupings are: 
 
• The Russell Group, representing 20 research-intensive universities like Oxford and 
Cambridge; 
• The 1994 Group of 19 other smaller, research-orientated pre-1992 universities; and 
• CMU (or Campaigning for Mainstream Universities) representing 32 post-1992 universities 
that were previously polytechnics. 
 
In addition, there is a recently formed, loose-knit coalition of 22 pre- and post-1992 
universities not aligned to any of the other three groups called, ironically, the University 
Alliance. 
 
As a result of these increasing divisions, there are fewer and fewer policy issues on which 
UUK can engineer a consensus among its members.  The differences in size and in branding 
and reputation between its members have become too great for this.  Competition for 
resources as a result of funding constraints and the introduction of quasi-markets has made it 
harder to achieve a common sense of purpose.  It has become increasingly difficult to handle 
internal conflict as institutional heads place the individual interests of their own university 
above those of the higher education sector as a whole – or even the interest group to which 
                                                     
35 Tapper, Ted (2007) The Governance of British Higher Education: The struggle for policy 
control, Dordecht, The Netherlands: Springer. 
36 King (2004) Op. Cit. 
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they belong.  There are still 35 members of UUK that do not belong to any interest group – 
even eschewing the less formalised University Alliance. 
 
UUK’s messages, as a consequence, have become increasingly bland, reduced to the lowest 
common denominator and designed not to cause offence to any of the interest groups, and 
particularly the influential research-intensive universities – which include the ‘world class’ 
universities that the Government has become so preoccupied with.  UUK’s statements, 
therefore, are often of less interest to journalists than the internal arguments and conflicts 
between various parts of the higher education sector that leak out from time to time. 
 
This gives UUK and its members an interesting dilemma: institutions have been placed in 
competitive situations in which they must act in their own best interest and yet, if they wish to 
influence how the system operates, they need to act with others to shape the overall 
governing structures and processes37.  No doubt, the Government and Funding Council will 
continue to ‘consult’ with UUK, partly because it always has, but also because it is a more 
efficient way of getting its message across to the sector, by dealing with one organisation 
rather then three or four.  However, this is not the same as negotiating with the universities; 
the State still determines policy and UUK reacts to it and is only partially engaged with the 
implementation of some of the policy decisions.  Consultation is largely symbolic and unlikely 
to give rise to substantive policy shifts.  In fact, increasingly, the new Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown’s approach is not even to ‘consult’ – or, to be more accurate, forewarn – universities 
and their representative bodies about impending policy interventions.  In 2006, as Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, he announced the abolition of the existing Research Assessment Exercise 
without consultation.  Now, as Prime Minister, he has done the same in combining universities 
with science, innovation and skills for employment in the new Department for Universities, 
Innovation and Skills, and in announcing improved financial support for students from low 
income families. 
 
Universities UK recognised some of these divisive issues in a review of its structures between 
2004 and 2006.  A working party was set up “to define what changes are needed better to 
accommodate the increasing diversity of institutions in the sector”.  It eventually made 18 
recommendations for change which were to be achieved through four projects.  The aims of 
the projects were to secure: 
• increased member engagement and commitment based on more transparent decision-
making; 
• higher levels of personal contact between members and the UUK office; 
• more effective communication; and 
• the development of member responsive services and value for money. 
Different external consultants were commissioned to undertake each project and produce a 
separate report. 
 
The focus on structure and communication in this review, rather than organisational purpose, 
leadership and culture are, in my view, telling.  The resulting changes have no doubt had 
some positive impacts, such as a sharper focus on the needs of members rather than those 
                                                     
37 Tapper and Salter (2003) Op.Cit. 
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of the organisation and its more prominent personnel, a concentration on providing value for 
money, and greater transparency in decision-making.  Those managing the review certainly 
avoided some of the more damaging suggestions that were floated, such as reserving 
membership of the Board for a certain number of representatives from each interest group 
and cutting subscriptions so that the secretariat could provide only the most basic services to 
members.  However, the review failed to answer some pressing questions, such as: How can 
UUK regain a primary position of influence in the policy-making process?  What is the optimal 
balance between advocacy and providing services to members?  How can UUK represent the 
special interests of particular groups of institutions as well as the common interests of the 
higher education sector as a whole?38  How can a UK-wide organisation speak for institutions 
operating in increasingly divergent national systems and – since recent local elections – 
under different political regimes?  The review of structures has not resolved these issues, and 
so they will re-emerge in the medium term, if not the short term. 
 
 
4. The challenges for intermediary bodies in the UK and beyond 
In changing recently from the Australian Vice-Chancellors’ Committee (AVCC), Universities 
Australia appears to have adopted a more radical approach to reorganisation than UUK39.  It 
comes after a decade of division in the sector over how it should be reformed, which had 
undermined its influence on the Government.  The final report of the review that informed this 
change deliberately portrayed higher education as an industry and the AVCC as needing to 
reconstitute itself as a ‘peak body’40.  In Australia, peak bodies are associations of companies 
generally established to act on behalf of all members when lobbying government or promoting 
their interests.  In other words, they explicitly recognise competition among their members, 
but also know that it is possible to improve trading conditions for their industry as a whole.  
The key developments are that: 
• The members are now the universities as institutions represented by their heads, and not 
just the individual vice-chancellors themselves. 
• The new name actually reflects a significant change, rather than being largely a matter of 
branding, as in the case of UUK in 2000. 
• Universities Australia has adopted a more outward-looking statement of purpose and is 
focusing mainly on advocacy, together with analysis and services to members. 
• It is developing a more sustained and strategic approach to advocacy, and ways to pursue 
common positions while recognising legitimate differences of view. 
• It is recruiting a new Chief Executive Officer, who will combine the roles of the AVCC’s 
chief executive with that of the president. 
                                                     
38 One notable recent UUK approach is to develop general principles or guidelines on a 
particular policy area, for example reform of the Research Assessment Exercise. 
39 Universities Australia media release, ‘Universities Australia established’, 22 May 2007, 
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• The Board will be responsible for identifying those issues on which Universities Australia 
should speak on behalf of the whole sector and those which are most appropriately left to 
individual universities or university groups to pursue. 
 
However, in July 2007 the Group of Eight research-intensive universities (the equivalent of 
the UK’s Russell Group) divided opinion in the sector with a new and bold plan for 
deregulation41, so it remains to be seen whether Universities Australia can hold the ring. 
 
In a sense, the first challenge for intermediary bodies in the United Kingdom, Australia and 
beyond, is to understand what is going on and, if they can, to come to terms with it42.  The 
key challenges in their relations with governments, then, are: 
                                                     
 
• Representative bodies achieving sufficient consensus among their members to warrant the 
Government negotiating with them, and 
• Intermediary bodies having real influence on policy in higher education, by formulating 
proposals, rather than just reacting to Government steering. 
 
The key challenges in their relations with institutions of higher education are: 
 
• Representative bodies reconciling the tensions between exerting political influence and 
providing services to members that offer value for money. 
• Intermediary bodies assisting institutions in rebuilding shared governance and 
strengthening the academic and administrative heartland. 
• Intermediary bodies ensuring that students fully participate in this new approach, rather 
than being treated merely as passive customers. 
 
However, there are deeper and more fundamental questions to address, such as: 
• What does higher education offer apart from increased economic productivity, in the 
spheres of society, culture, the environment and democratic participation, for example? 
• Who are universities’ best allies in promoting higher education as being in a good position 
to make a positive contribution to these spheres? 
• How can UUK, UA and other representative bodies help promote real diversity among 
institutions of higher education in which differences of mission and purpose are more 
important than status distinctions? 
 
Of course, there are also challenges for governments in the increasingly complex sphere of 
higher education policy-making: the more fragmented the higher education sector is, the more 
difficult it is for governments to relate to it.  They need the co-operation and engagement of 
higher education institutions and of the academic community to realise their policies at 
institutional and departmental levels.  They cannot regulate and closely manage the 
performance of universities and, at the same time, expect them to experiment, innovate, 
achieve distinctiveness and compete internationally.  For the UK Government, in particular, 
41 Group of Eight (2007) Seizing the Opportunities: Designing new policy architecture for 
higher education and research, Manuka ACT: Group of Eight; ‘Go8 plan triggers fears for 
non-elite’, The Australian, 13 June 2007. 
42 Tapper (2007) Op. Cit. 
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can the Higher Education Funding Councils act as buffer bodies any more?  Are they, in 
effect, becoming more like planning bodies, and therefore in danger of attempting to manage 
the performance of institutions? 
 
 
5. Questions for university associations in Japan 
 
This final section offers a number of questions for university associations in Japan, drawn 
from the foregoing analysis of the UK situation – and the particular position of Universities UK 
– the recent literature in English on developments in Japanese higher education since the 
2004 reforms and the discussion at the conference in August 2007 at which the original 
version of this paper was first given. 
 
How should university associations position themselves in relation to the contradictory trends 
of deregulation (of curricula, financial management and staff recruitment) and regulation 
(through medium-term planning, evaluation and institutional funding allocations)?  As Keiko 
Yokoyama asks43, has the mode of co-ordination really changed that much since the 
incorporation of the national universities?  Several other authors have also pointed out that 
strong governmental control persists, augmented by pressures from external stakeholders 
and new intermediary bodies44.  Perhaps there is as much onus on MEXT to avoid micro-
managing institutions through the medium-term plans and external evaluation and ensure the 
flexibility and autonomy that has been promised to institutions?45 
 
How can university associations increase their capacity for lobbying the decision-makers, 
such as those in MEXT and the Ministries of Finance and Local Government?  If the 
associations decide to employ professional lobbyists and media relations experts, how will 
they pay for them?  (Do they need to seek additional sources of income?)  Who should they 
lobby, how and what should be the aims and objectives of campaigning? 
 
What role can university associations play in medium-term planning and external evaluation?  
Is real negotiation with MEXT and its intermediary bodies possible?46  As Jun Oba asks, can 
a real higher education community be built on a genuine culture of dialogue?47  What is the 
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purpose of evaluation?  For organisational learning and development?  To increase 
competition and the marketisation of higher education?  To impose universal standards on all 
universities?  There are many different reasons for evaluating institutions, and the purpose 
ought to determine the approach and methodology to be used.  Can evaluation lead to real 
improvement and innovation, rather than game-playing and risk aversion (as in the UK) by 
universities?  Who will train and evaluate the evaluators?  In particular, can the university 
associations assist the evaluation and accreditation bodies in finding more appropriate ways 
of evaluating education and research processes?48  If performance indicators are to be 
developed for universities, how can the associations ensure that the indicators used actually 
measure quality, and not just what can be measured?  What role will research in higher 
education play in this, for example, can it help to promote ‘evidence-based’ policy-making? 
 
Do the national university corporations and private universities have increasingly common 
interests?  Especially as the national university corporations are being encouraged to 
augment their income from external sources and competitive MEXT funding streams have 
been opened up to private universities.  Should the different university associations seek to 
collaborate where the interests of their members start to converge?  International exchange of 
students is, perhaps, one area that university associations of all types can collaborate on.  
Can the vertical hierarchy of institutions be turned into a series of horizontal distinctions 
between different university missions that have equal status as well as a diversity of 
purposes? 
 
How can university associations encourage institutions to involve academics and students 
more in decision-making and the governance of their institutions?49  Is there a national role 
for guidance, advice, support and training?  If there is, do university associations have a role 
to play in this?  Should external members of the administrative councils and governing board
be more aware of the importance of academics’ and students’ involvement? 
s 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
Are there parallels between the developments in the governance of universities and changes 
in the governance of university associations?  Perhaps both need to ensure the quality and 
transparency of their decision-making, meaningful input from external stakeholders and the 
prioritising and focusing of efforts.  The presidents – at least of the National University 
Corporations – now have considerable power and influence.  How can university associations 
help to ensure there are no governance failures, where a president becomes too powerful, to 
the detriment of the university?  How can the associations represent all parts of a university, 
and not just its leadership? 
 
The management capacity of universities needs to be enhanced, with new people and new 
expertise.  What is the role of the Centre for National University Finance and Management in 
this?  Is it working together with the university associations in providing training, support, 
advice and funding for appropriate initiatives in this area?  Are there new postgraduate 
courses catering for administrators and managers at different points in their careers?   
marketisation, and other reforms – A comparative study, COE Publication Series No. 29: 
pps 15-36, March, Research Institute for Higher Education, Hiroshima University. 
48 Oba, Jun (2005) ‘The Incorporation of National Universities in Japan: Initial Reactions of the 
New University Corporations’, Higher Education Management and Policy, 17(2): 105-125. 
49 Oba (2007) Op. Cit. 
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In particular, how can university administrators’ and managers’ understanding of the 
processes of education and research be enhanced, so that they can administer and manage 
them better?  Are there professional associations in which specialist managers can share 
experiences and offer each other support?  Are academics being prepared for management 
roles?  Is the Government providing sufficient funding for this?  For, if university 
managements focus on operational matters rather than the core functions of the university, 
the quality of education and research may suffer.  If they ignore the cultural dimension of 
universities and, in particular, the management of change, the reforms they try to introduce 
will more often fail50. 
 
Is enough being done to raise the status of education in relation to research in the National 
University Corporations?51  More so, are the links between research and teaching being 
made, and strategies put in place to maximise the synergies?  What is the role of the 
intermediary bodies in this? 
 
The steady reduction of the public funding for higher education in the UK led to a decline in 
the quality of university buildings and facilities.  Mr Aizawa, President of the Japan 
Association of National Universities, has publicly expressed his concern about this happening 
in Japan, too52.  What can the university associations do to highlight the problem and reverse 
this trend? 
 
 
William Locke 
Assistant Director 
Centre for Higher Education Research and Information 
The Open University 
44 Bedford Row 
London WC1R 4LL 
United Kingdom 
Tel: +44 (0)20 7447 2553 
Email: w.d.locke@open.ac.uk 
Web: http://www.open.ac.uk/cheri/index.htm 
 
August 2007 
                                                     
50 Birnbaum (2004) Op. Cit. 
51 Amano, Ikua and Gregory S Poole (2005) ‘The Japanese University in Crisis’, Higher 
Education, 50: 685-711. 
52 Oba (2007) Op. Cit. 
